A fragment with the same provably recursive functions as n iterated inductive definitions is obtained by restricting second order arithmetic in the following way. The underlying language allows only up to n + 1 nested second order quantifications and those are in such a way, that no second order variable occurs free in the scope of another second order quantifier. The amount of induction on arithmetical formulae only affects the arithmetical consequences of these theories, whereas adding induction for arbitrary formulae increases the strength by one inductive definition.
Introduction and Related Work
The study of subsystems of second order arithmetic ("Analysis") has a long tradition in proof theory. Here we investigate a fragment that is defined by a restriction of the language. By allowing quantification of a second order variable only for formulae with at most this second order variable free, we obtain a proof theoretic weaker fragment. This fragment is motivated by a study of Altenkirch and Coquand [4] who used the non-nested case to obtain a "finitary subsystem of the polymorphic lambda calculus".
The fragment of analysis studied in this article is particularly suited as a target for the embedding of theories of iterated inductive definitions [1] . Systems with Π 1 1 -comprehension have been studied by various authors [15, 9, 8] . An overview over proof theoretical aspects of inductive definitions can be found in the lecture notes volume by Buchholz, Feferman, Pohlers and Sieg [7] .
The main emphasis of this article is the study of the influence of induction on the natural numbers on the provably recursive functions of these systems. Whereas induction for only arithmetical formulae only influences the arithmetical consequences, induction on arbitrary formulae increases the strength by an additional inductive definition. A technically similar observation has been made by Arai [5] when comparing the fast and the slow growing hierarchy.
The rest of this article, which is based on the author's doctoral thesis [2] , is organised as follows. In Section 2 we define the formal systems under consideration. Sections 3 and 4 successively embed the systems of iterated inductive definitions in fragments of second order arithmetic first with, and then, at the price of an additional quantifier, without induction. Finally in Section 5 a proof theoretical analysis of the fragments of second order arithmetic is provided, that can be locally formalised in systems of iterated inductive definitions.
The meta theory for this article is Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, PRA for short. That is, whenever we claim a theorem to hold, we claim it to hold provably in PRA. Note that it therefore amounts to a stronger statement to say that a statement "holds", rather than just saying it is provable in, say, ID 
Definition of the Systems
The language of arithmetic, denoted by L 0 , consists of a single relation symbol = for equality and function symbols for all primitive recursive functions. These are built from function symbols for the constant function zero of every arity (where we denote the nullary zero by 0), the unary function symbol S for the successor function and n-ary function symbols for the i'th projection for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, by arity-respecting composition and primitive recursion. The intended meaning of these function symbols is formalized in their axiomatization in Definition 2.2.
For systems based on a language extending that of arithmetic, we use the usual notation n for the n'th numeral, that is, if n is a natural number then n is short for S(S(. . . (S n 0))).
As logical connectives we use those of first order logic: conjunction, implication, universal quantification and absurdity. Moreover we use the other connectives as abreviations in the usual way, so ¬A ≡ A → ⊥, A ∨ B ≡ ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B), and ∃xA ≡ ¬∀x¬A.
We use A, B, C as notations for formulae. As usual, finite lists of notations differing only in successive indices are abbreviated by putting an arrow over the notation for these entities. So, for example, t is short for t 1 , . . . , t n . This may as well include the empty list, if n = 0. When displaying variables of a formula as in A( x) we want to distinguish some of the variables that might occur in A; after having done so, we use A( t ) as a shorthand for the substitution A [ t / x ]. All our substitutions are assumed to be capture free in the usual sense, which is, up to α-equivalence, a well-defined notion. We hereby adopt the convention that we identify α-equal formulae. We also use A, B, A, and B as notations for formulae, tacitly assuming them to have been displayed as A(x), B(x), A(X, x), and B(X, x) for some X and x. We use a centred dot · to denote a distinguished first order variable.
Starting from the language L 0 of arithmetic we define languages L i and sets Pos i , Neg i ⊂ L i [X] of positive and negative operator forms by induction on i. To do so, we set
where the P A i+1 are new predicate symbols (to be understood as the least fixed point of the operator A) and Pos i and Neg i are those sets of formulae that contain X at most positively and at most negatively, respectively.
We use the abbreviation A ⊂ B ≡ ∀x(A(x) → B(x)).
Definition 2.2 (basic axioms).
The basic axioms of arithmetical theories are the following.
• The equality axioms t = t, s = t → t = s, s = t → t = r → s = r and t = s → f t = f s, for arbitrary function symbols f.
• St = 0 → ⊥
• The defining equations for the primitive recursive function symbols. We have f t = 0, if f is the function symbol for the n-ary zero, f t = t i+1 , if f is the function symbol for the i'th projection, f0 t = g t and f(Sx) t = hx(fx t) t if f is the function symbol for the function built by primitive recursion from g and h, and f s = g(h 1 s) . . . (h n s), if f is the function symbol for the composition of g and h.
Remark 2.3 (Injectivity of the successor). Let h be the function symbol for binary first projection and Pred the function symbol for the function built by primitive recursion from h and 0. We have the axioms Pred(Sx) = hx(Predx) and hx(Predx) = x. Hence, by transitivity of equality we have Pred(Sx) = x. In particular the assumption St = Ss implies Pred(St) = Pred(Ss) which, implies t = s. So injectivity of the successor is derivable. Note that all these proofs are based on minimal logic and do not use induction.
n is an extension of Peano Arithmetic in the language L n . That is, it is based on classical predicate logic, contains the basic axioms (equality, 1 = 0, defining axioms for the primitive recursive functions) and induction on the full language L n .
Moreover, for arbitrary formulae F of the language and 0 < i ≤ n the following axioms are added, which define P A i as the least fixed point of the operator A. 
ID
− n is called the "negative fragment", because all connectives (conjunction, implication, universal quantification and absurdity) are negative. Recall that absurdity has no special meaning in minimal logic, but is just an unspecified nullary junctor. We still use ∃ and ∨ as abbreviations, but keep in mind that they do not behave as positive connectives. Definition 2.6 (ID * n ). We define ID * n to be the fragment of the system ID − n where all the operators A of the fixed points P A i are strictly positive in the second order variable.
Proof. Induction on A. For example, the second statement in the case of "A → B": A ∈ Pos i , B ∈ Neg i , hence (under the assumption A ⊂ B) by the induction hypotheses for arbitrary x it holds that A(A, x) → A(B, x) and B(B, x) → B(A, x). Assume A(B, x) → B(B, x) and A(A, x); hence B(A, x) by three applications of modus ponens.
It should be noted that the proof does not use any axioms. Hence the statement is even valid in minimal predicate logic. This will be used later (in Remark 3.12).
Since no induction is available, we should think of our universe as also containing objects which are not natural numbers. So we will often need the property of being a natural number, that is, the property of being an object for which the principle of induction holds. This predicate N x is defined in the usual way as N x ≡ ∀X.∀y(Xy → X(S(y))) → X0 → Xx
When working in fragments of second order arithmetic we use the abbreviation A ⊂ B for ∀x.N x → A(x) → B(x). This differs from the use of this abbreviation in the systems of iterated inductive definitions. But as these are different systems, which even have a different language, there is no danger of confusion. Moreover, as noted in Remark 4.2, up to our canonical embeddings of ID − n into HA 2 these notions coincide. Next we will formalise the fragments of HA 2 under consideration. We will define a family of subsystems of second order arithmetic. The restriction will be a restriction of the language. In HA 2 n we will allow n nested, but not "interleaved" (in the sense of Matthes [13] ), second order quantifiers, so that no second order variable is allowed to occur free in the scope of another second order quantifier.
We will also consider the amount of induction for arithmetical formulae as a second parameter. This parameter, which allows enough coding, will turn out to be independent of the proof theoretic strength (Theorem 5.27). In fact, it only affects the arithmetical consequences of these systems (Corollary 5.20).
For technical reasons, it does not suffice to count the nesting depths of second order variables but we have to use second order variables of different levels (see especially the proof of Lemma 5.8). However, universal formulae ∀X k .A(X k ) may be instantiated with arbitrary formulae of the language, as long as a legal formula is obtained (confer Remark 2.16). Allowing instantiation to the full language is essential, as in a "predicative version" of this system only the functions of Grzegorczyk's [10] class E 4 would be obtained as provably recursive functions [12] , and a predicative version restricted to levels 0 and 1 would only yield the Kalmár [11] elementary functions [3] .
From now on, we assume a fixed assignment of levels 0, 1, . . . to all secondorder variables except for a distinguished one, X. Let X i range over second order variables of level i. We assume that there are infinitely many second order variables of every level. The predicate N x uses a second order variable of level 0, that is, we have •
We write I Obviously we have I * n ⊂ I * n+1 . It should be noted that X 0 0 ∧ X 1 0 is not a legal formula; nor is X 0 0 ∧ ∀X 0 .(X 0 0 → X 0 0). Definition 2.12 (HA 2 n ). The system HA 2 n is defined to be the fragment of HA 2 , where all occurring formulae are in I * n . Remark 2.13. It should be noted that the fragments of analysis presented here are somewhat non-standard in that elimination of second order quantification is allowed for arbitrary formulae, but the language of the system itself is restricted.
To compare the approach of this article with more conventional presentations consider the system, where the ∀X-elimination is restricted to variables
and comprehension axioms of the form
are present for all A ∈ I * n , maybe with other variables than x free. Then a partial cut-elimination shows that all proofs of I * n -formulae in that system can be transformed into proofs in HA 2 n . In other words, our systems HA 2 n can be thought of as canonical proofs for I * n -comprehension. It may, however, be interesting to note that when showing the main Lemma 5.9 towards the admissibility of ∀X-elimination we actually use that we have a good overview of normal (semi-formal) proofs of ∀XA(X).
Remark 2.14. We note that, up to (level-ignoring) α-equality all formulae in I 2 n are built from a single second order variable. This can be proved by induction on the Definition 2.11 of I 
Remark 2.16. Note that in Lemma 2.15 it was crucial that the free second order variable of A is of level n. Substitution in free variables of too low level might lead to illegal formulae. Consider for example A(
This will not be a problem when embedding ID
n as all formulae we deal with in this embedding will contain no free second order variables.
In our systems HA 2 n we do not have any induction. One can think of a universe containing other first order objects than just the natural numbers. However, everything built up from zero and sucessor is a natural number. The following two lemmata can be shown by a simple argument within HA To do so, we use the one provided by Bucholz [6] .
we define its double negation translation A and simultaneously showing A ∈ Pos i (or A ∈ Neg i ) implies A ∈ Pos i (or A ∈ Neg i respectively).
• (Xt) ≡ ¬¬Xt and (P
• ⊥ ≡ ⊥ and A ≡ ¬¬A for A ∈ L 0 atomic and different from ⊥.
• The translation is homomorphic with respect to the logical connectives, that is (
Since (doubly) negated formulae are stable, a simple induction on A shows
In the target of our embedding the only inductive predicates are of the form P A i , that is, only fixed points of properly negated forms are built. We can now show that these predicates are stable.
Proof. We have ID
, t) by Lemma 3.2 which shows that A is stable, independently of the stability of X. So the claim follows.
By a simple induction on A we show
But at least the formulae are provably equivalent.
Proof. Induction on A, using Lemma 3.2 for the only non-trivial case A ≡ Xt.
To complete our embedding we have to show that the translation of the axioms are provable.
Proof. Using the syntactical equality shown in Proposition 3.4 we calculate (∀x(A(P
. This formula is provable from the corresponding induction axiom, since trivially P
. By Lemmata 3.3 and 3.5 this formula is provably equivalent to an instance of the corresponding induction axiom.
Proof. By Lemma 3.6 the translations of the induction axioms are provable. The translations of the non-induction axioms (Definition 2.2) follow immediately from the corresponding axiom.
Moreover, classical logic is admissible since the translations of all formulae are stable by Lemma 3.2.
Since minimal logic proves ¬¬¬R(x, y) ↔ ¬R(x, y) we get conservativity for Π 0 2 -statements.
As second order arithmetic is an impredicative system, the set theoretical definition of the least fixed point can be formalized easily.
we define a formula A * of second order arithmetic inductively as follows.
• The embedding is homomorphic for the other connectives, that is,
A simple induction shows that the range of the embedding is the fragment we had in mind.
n . In particular A * has no free second order variables.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3.10, noting that for A ∈ Pos i the predicate X does not occur under any second-order quantifier (since Pos i only contains first-order formulae in X).
Remark 3.12. As in the proof of proposition 2.7 one shows that the translations of positive formulae are monotone.
Lemma 3.13.
Proof. By definition we have
Arguing informally in HA 2 n,(+) , the translation can be proved as follows. Let x be arbitrary and assume A * (P A i * , x). Let X i be arbitrary and assume
Using that last assumption we get ∀y(P
Hence, by monotonicity (remark 3.12) of A * we get ∀yA
Arguing informally in HA 2 n,(+) this can be proved as follows. Assume ∀y.A * (F * , y) → F * (y). Let x be arbitrary and moreover assume
Specialising the last assumption to F * we get F * (x) from our first assumption.
Remark 3.14 (Monotone inductive definitions).
Note that in the proof of Lemma 3.13 only monotonicity of A * was used. The only point in restricting P A i to positive A is to have a canonical proof that A * is monotone. So one might be tempted to allow P A i for arbitrary A and relativize the first axiom to A being monotone. However, monotonicity is a second order concept and does not fit well into the arithmetical framework of systems of inductive definitions. Note that, due to the restriction to one second-order variable, some mild coding is necessary to express monotonicity: ∀X.X 0, · ⊂ X 1, · → . . .. In particular, for Π 0 2 -statements this corollary reads as
As all the axioms not concerned with the P
∀x.¬∀y¬R(x, y).
Embedding of HA
Induction can be eliminated by relativizing all first order quantifiers to the property of being a natural number. • (∀xA) ≡ ∀x.N x → A , (X n t) ≡ X n+1 t and (∀X n A) ≡ ∀X n+1 A
• The other connectives are translated homomorphically, that is (R t) ≡ R t, 
Proof. Unfolding the definition yields (∀x(
Arguing informally within HA 2 n+1 we assume ∀x.N x → A (x) → A (Sx) and A (0). Moreover let x be arbitrary and assume N x. We have to show A (x).
Instantiate A .
In particular, for Π ∀x.N x → ¬∀y(N y → ¬R(x, y)).
Proof Theoretic Reduction of HA
From a proof theoretic point of view, the most difficult rule of second order arithmetic is the elimination of a second order quantifier, as this rule lacks the subformula property. In fact, when stepping from ∀XA(X) to A(A) the formula might get arbitrary complex. We shall therefore develop a semi-formal notion of "normal proofs", that is, of proofs with the subformula property, in such a way that ∀X-elimination becomes admissible. The main obstacle to achieve this are proofs by assumption.
The Ω-rule, introduced by Buchholz [6] and used in the context of second order arithmetic by Buchholz and Schütte [8] 
The overall strategy of our proof theoretic reduction is as follows. We first define a notion d n,(K) Γ = A of semi-formal proofs (Definition 5.2). This notion of proof features the base case (atomic and ∀X-formulae) of partial truth predicates f (K) Γ = C for I * N -formulae (Definition 5.11). Since elimination of second order quantification of maximal level (Lemma 5.9) and the Ω k+1 -rule are admissible (Lemma 5.15), our partial truth predicates have all the needed properties of a truth predicate, including ∀X-elimination (Lemma 5.17). So a simple induction on HA 2 N shows that everything provable is "true" (Theorem 5.19). Since our notion of "truth" is built on the notion of provability, we obtain (Lemma 5.14) a semi-formal proof and a collapsing property (Lemma 5.10) finally gets us back to the more usual notion of proof (and hence "real truth"). •
• If A ∈ Neg 2 n then ∀xA ∈ Neg 2 n ; if A ∈ Pos 2 n then ∀xA ∈ Pos 2 n .
• If A ∈ Neg • If A, B ∈ Neg We will make use of various notations of recursion theory, most prominently, the coding k 1 , . . ., k n of lists of natural numbers and the i'th projection (n) i of a natural number n, thought of as the code of a list. That is, ( k 1 , . . ., k n ) i = k i+1 . We assume a primitive recursive such coding with k 1 , . . ., k n > k i . Moreover, by {e} (k) we denote the "Kleene bracket": the value, if it exists, of the e'th partial recursive function at argument k. The notation {e} (k) = presupposes that {e} (k) is defined. We note that {e} (k) = can be expressed by a Σ 1 -formula in the language of arithmetic. So every theory extending PRA, hence in particular ID * N , provides enough induction on the natural numbers to show all the needed properties of our coding functions.
We also presuppose some canonical arithmetization ("Gödel numbering") of all our syntactical entities which we denote by . We assume this Gödel numbering to be such that all the usual operations on syntactical entities are primitive recursive on the codes. In accordance with our convention that we identify α-equal formulae we assume that the codes are invariant under α-equivalence. We use dotted variablesẋ within the Gödel brackets to signify that the object coded by x, rather than the code of x itself should be inserted at this position. We assume that all our codings are standard, that is, they have the usual monotonicity properties. In particular, we presuppose that the Gödel number of every formula is bigger than that of every proper subformula. We use σ as a notation for first order substitutions; that is, when using σ, it is tacitly understood, that σ ranges over all first order substitutions (and only those). Application of substitution σ to a formula A is denoted by postfixing its notation, as in Aσ. If Γ = {A 1 , . . . , A n } is a set of formulae, we write Γσ for the set {A 1 σ, . . . , A n σ}.
Informally, normal proofs are those where no elimination follows an introduction. Technically this can be expressed by allowing elimination rules only if the major premise is an elimination, assumption or axiom.
Let N ≥ 1 and K ≥ 0 be a natural numbers kept fixed for the rest of this section. We will develop a notion of semi-formal proofs for HA to N levels of nested (but not interleaved) quantifications, but equipped with induction for Π 0 K -formulae. Nevertheless we will continue to state all our theorems as theorems of our meta theory PRA.
Definition 5.2 (Normal derivations d n,(K) Γ = A). We define intro(d) to be a shorthand for (d)
By iterated inductive definitions we define the relations d n,(K) Γ = A for n < N and d a natural number, A ∈ I * n+1 a formula and Γ ⊂ I * n+1 a finite set of formulae.
• (Axiom) 0 n,(K) Γ = A if A ≡ Bσ, where σ is an arbitrary first order substitution and B is an axiom in the sense of Definition 2.2 or of the form ∀x(A(x) → A(Sx)) → A(0) → ∀xA(x) for some Π 0 K -formula A.
•
where Γ is the subset of those formulae of Γ not containing x free.
• (ω) If n ≥ 1 and for all terms t it holds that {e} t n,(K) Γ = A(t) then 6, e n,(K) Γ = ∀xA(x).
where Γ is the subset of those formulae of Γ not containing X free.
• (Ω k+1 ) If k < n and d n,(K) Γ = ∀X k A(X k ) and (for all ∆ ⊂ Neg
Remark 5.3. The reader is invited to verify that the above Definition 5.2 of the relations · n,(K) · = · for n = 0, . . . , N − 1 can be formalized in ID * N −1 . In this formalization we would use appropriate Gödel codes instead of Γ and A. Recalling that we identify α-equal formulae also in our meta theory, the definition fits with our convention that α-equal formulae have identical Gödel codes.
So, officially, for 1 ≤ n < N we have a formula A K,n ∈ Pos n−1 , formalizing the underlying operator and a predicate P A K,n n for the fixed point. We write
The relation · 0,(K) · = · is in fact a primitive recursive relation, and formalized as such. It should be noted, that the definition of · 0,(K) · = · is finitely branching so that it is reasonable to speak of "the number of inferences". Moreover, this number can be read off the code of the derivation in a primitive recursive way.
We have "saved" an inductive definition by inspecting only a particular branch at the first "ω-branching" level and so could obtain an arithmetical relation. This technique has a strong similarity to the one used in Arai's "slow growing analogue to Buchholz' proof" [5] . There "pointwise transfinite induction" for the ordinal notation system for the ordinal of ID c p was shown within ID c p−1 . The crucial observation was that the lowest inductive definition becomes arithmetical when for an ordinal term of type ω only the n'th element of the fundamental sequence is considered, for a fixed but arbitrary n given from the outside. In our case, to show a property for all terms we are happy with a proof just for a single variable -provided it is sufficiently new.
The reason why we nevertheless need the (ω) rule is that later we will (in Definition 5.11) define (partial) truth predicates and then will have to show (in Lemma 5.16) that everything derivable in · n,(K) · = · is true. In particular, we have to show that from a proof of a ∀xA statement we get the truth of A(t) for all terms t. In the case of a universal statement introduced by (∀x-intro), soundness is ensured by admissibility of first order substitution. But such a proof would fail at an (Ω)-rule. To conclude . . . n,(K) Γσ = Bσ by an (Ω)-rule again we would have to provide (in a uniform way) a proof of . . . n,(K) ∆, Γσ = Bσ. However, the induction hypothesis would only give a proof of . . . n,(K) ∆σ, Γσ = Bσ. This should also be compared to the careful formulation of Lemma 5.8. N . This will be used tacitly in the sequel. ¬intro(f(. . . , d, . . . ) ).
Remark 5.5 (Weakening). As a theorem of ID
Proof. Induction on d 0,(K) Γ = A. Note that (in Definition 5.2) we have constructed our set of axioms to be closed under substitution. d ends in (∀x-intro) , that is, if d is of the form d = 6, d , x , then n = 0 and there is a natural number e that {e} t 0,(K) Γ = A(t) and {e} t has less inferences than d.
Proof. First we note that the rule (∀x-intro) is only present at level 0. Then we apply Lemma 5.6 to the premise of the derivation, that is, we apply Lemma 5.6 to the derivation d .
Lemma 5.8 (Substitution for second order variables).
There is a primitive recursive f such that the following is a theorem of ID *
where θ is a substitution of second order variables with only variables of level n in its domain such that Γθ and Aθ are well-formed, and θ is a permutation of second order variables of level less than n.
Proof. Induction along the inductive Definition 5.2 of d n,(K
For the case (Axiom) we note that our axioms do not contain second order variables.
For the cases of an elimination rule we simultaniously proof that the transformed proof is also by elimnation.
For (∀X-intro) with the abstracted variable X of level less than n let X be a new variable of the same level as X. Let θ = [X , X/X, X ]θ be the composition of permutations and apply the induction hypothesis with substitutions θ and θ . For (∀X-intro) with the abstracted variable X of level n let X be a new second order variable of level n. Apply the induction hypothesis for θ extended by X → X . In both cases conclude by (∀X-intro) again, with X as abstracted variable.
For the case (Ω k+1 ) we have by induction hypothesis . .
whereθ is the inverse of θ . Hence, by the premise of the (Ω k+1 )-rule we have . . . n,(K) ∆θ , Γ = B. Again by induction hypothesis we obtain . . . n,(K) ∆, Γθ θ = Bθ θ, noting that ∆θ = ∆. Therefore an application of the (Ω k+1 )-rule again completes the derivation.
All the remaining cases are immediate by induction hypothesis, where in the case of (∀x-intro) the needed renaming is provided by Lemma 5.6.
Note that the proof of the following lemma does not introduce new (Ω)-inferences. The inferences are instead only reconstructed where they occur in the given semi-formal derivation. However, the lemma only considers quantification at the topmost level and this is important, for otherwise the restriction Γ ⊂ Neg 2 n would not suffice. Nevertheless, in applications of the (Ω)-rule in Lemma 5.17 the contexts are of sufficiently small level. So we will use the lemma for various values n strictly smaller than N . Lemma 5.9 (Admissibility of ∀X n -elimination). There is a primitive recursive f such that the following is a theorem of ID * n . If d n,(K) Γ = ∀X n A(X n ) with Γ ⊂ Neg 2 n and A ∈ I * n such that A(A) is a well-formed formula, then f(
Proof. Induction along the inductive Definition 5.2 of d n,(K) Γ = ∀X n A(X n ).
An elimination rule would require an axiom or assumption containing ∀X n A(X n ) strictly positive, which cannot be as our axioms are first order and Γ ⊂ Neg 
Hence an application of the (Ω k+1 )-rule yields the desired derivation. If = 0 and the last rule was the (ω) rule we use the premise of this rule for some new variable y and conclude by (∀x-intro). The remaining cases are trivial.
With our semi-formal notion of normal proofs we have an appropriate semantics for ∀X-statements. Based on this semantics we define (partial) truth predicates in the usual way, similar to Tait's computability predicates [14] .
To be proof theoretically optimal, these predicates are defined on the metalevel, by a family of formulae. Of course, an additional inductive definition would suffice to define these predicates internally, requiring, however, a stronger system.
. By induction on k we define a family f (K),k Γ = C of formulae in the language of ID * N −1 such that for all C ∈ I * N with less than k logical symbols, all f ∈ N and Γ ⊂ Neg 2 N −1 the following properties hold.
Definition 5.11 could be defined by induction on C. However, we need slightly more uniformity. So, officially, we define a family A K,k (x, y, z) of formulae indexed by k, with free number variables for f , Γ and C in such a way that whenever the number of logical symbols in C is at most k then A K,k (f, Γ , C ) is equivalent to f (K) Γ = C as defined (say) by induction on C. This can easily be achieved by setting (with the A K,N −1 of Remark 5.3)
A K,k (x, y, z) : ≡ ("z codes a formula which is atomic or of the form ∀XB"
∨ ("x codes a formula of the form B → C"
It should also be noted that for k ≥ k it is provable in ID * N −1 , that if z codes a formula with at most k logical symbols then A k (x, y, z) and A k (x, y, z) are equivalent. This can be shown by induction on k. From now on we will write f (K) Γ = C for A K,k (f, Γ , C ) with appropriately chosen k, tacitly assuming k to be big enough. It should be obvious, that for each of the following theorems we provide a primitive recursive family of proofs.
Remark 5.12. As weakening is admissible for derivations (Remark 5.5), an easy induction shows that it is also admissible for the truth relation. More precisely, provably in ID *
Lemma 5.13 (Renaming of second order variables). There is a primitive recursive function f, such that for every natural number k the following is a theorem of ID * N −1 . If C is a formula with at most k logical symbols, θ a level-preserving permutation of second order variables, and
We write f Lemma 5.14. There are primitive recursive functions f and g, such that for every k the following is a theorem of ID * N −1 . If C is a formula with at most k logical symbols, then
Again we write f C Γ for f( C , Γ ) (·) and g C Γ for g( C , Γ ) (·). Proof. Induction on the logical complexity of C. We only consider the nontrivial cases.
If C is of the form A → B we argue as follows.
• We have A ∈ Pos 2 N −1 and B ∈ Neg
• We have A ∈ Neg 
If C is of the form ∀xA(x) we argue in the following way.
• Since ¬intro(d), we have 4, e, ∀xA(x)
• We have for every term t that {f } t (K) Γ = A(t), hence by induction hypothesis g
for a new variable y, and we apply (∀x)-intro.) Lemma 5.15 (Admissibility of (Ω k+1 ) for k ≤ N − 1). There is a primitive recursive function f such that for every k the following is a theorem of ID * N −1 . Let C be a formula with at most k logical symbols and assume for Γ ⊂ Neg
Again we write f C Γ for f( C , Γ ) (·). Proof. Induction on the logical complexity of C.
Case C is atomic or of the form ∀XB and so we have to show . . .
So by induction hypothesis (using Γ, Γ ⊂ Neg Case (→-intro). By induction hypothesis we know that
Hence e (K) ∆, Γ = A → B by Definition 5.11 of the truth predicates, where e is an index of the recursive function f → f d, f 1 , A 1 , . . ., f n , A n , f, A . Case (∀x-intro). By Corollary 5.7 we find an index e such that for every term t we have {e} t 0,(K) ∆, A = A(t) with a derivation with no more inferences. Hence by induction hypothesis we get the desired truth relation in a recursive way for every t.
Case (∀X-intro). Lemma 5.18 (Admissibility of (∀X-introduction)). There is a partially recursive f such that for every formula A the following is a theorem of ID * N −1 .
If f (K) Γ = A(X k ) for some k ≤ N − 1 and Γ ⊂ Neg 2 N −1 , such that X k is not free in Γ, then f(f, X k , A , Γ ) (K) Γ = ∀X k A(X k ).
Proof. We have A(X k ) ∈ Pos 2 N −1 . Hence by Lemma 5.14 we have . . . N −1,(K) Γ = A(X k ), so by an application of (∀X-intro) we get a derivation of ∀X k A(X k ), so the truth predicate holds for that formula. 
